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Both the American and French Revolutions went beyond national
borders and shook the world. This was the beginning of a new age. As
BALLANCHE said in the middle of the Restoration: "Nous sommes arrivés à un
âge critique de l'esprit humain, à une époque de fin et de renouvellement. La
société ne repose plus sur les mêmes bases, et les peuples ont besoin
d'institutions qui soient en rapport avec leurs destinées futures. Nous sommes
semblables aux Israélites dans le désert”1, he work of Alexis de TOCQUEVILLE
(1808-1859) comes into this context of profound change. He had been born
into a family of Norman aristocracy, related to MALESHERBES and
CHATEAUBRIAND. The July Monarchy removed his stock from power and
placed it in the ranks of legitimism.
After his trip to the United States, he began his political thought,
encouraged by the implicit desire to offer his world a prospect for the future in
the face of the new liberal regime of bourgeoisie and officials. In 1835, when he
was thirty, he published the first volume of La Démocratie en Amérique (D),
which was a great success, unlike the second, which was more ambitious and
detailed, published five years later.
In short, it led him to political action, that was not very spectacular, and
that left him with a certain feeling of disappointment. A Member of Parliament
from 1839 until 1851 for Valognes, where he lived, he was not particularly
enthusiastic about the Republic and was relieved when CAVAINGAC defeated
the people of Paris. Although he was not a member of the commission that
drafted the Constitution in 1848, he did not manage to impose on it his main
theories. Finally, in 1849, he became Foreign Secretary under BARROT, and
remained in this position for five months.
The Coup d'Etat by Louis Napoleon ended his political career. His
critical comments on the revolutionary period, collected in Souvenirs (S),
written in retirement in Sorrento, have a bitterness resembling that of MARX. In
1856, already away from active politics, he prepared and published the first
part of L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution (AR), a study on the traditional roots
of the French Revolution and on his major subject: the end of aristocracy, the
end of his world.
His work and his personality reflect to some extent the inner conflict of a
socially defeated person, as SCHMITT indicates2. This causes him to adopt a
remote attitude, from which he makes a proposal to open up a course in the
future for his world. For this reason he can disassociate himself both from the
myth of operational democracy and from his conviction for counter-
revolutionary ideas.
According to MAYER3, TOCQUEVILLE’s theory is neither that of a
liberal, nor, as MOLNAR says4, that of a counter-revolutionary. From a
profound axiological viewpoint, he constructs a democratic, scientific and
prescriptive theory. The result however, is more radical than the one that he
himself would willingly have been prepared to accept and, in particular, the one
that his potential followers could assimilate.
More indebted to the method than to the ideas of MONTESQUIEU, critic
of Physiocracy and of "literary politics", that is to say of Illustration (the
question "Quel Français s'aviserait aujourd'hui d'écrire les livres de DIDEROT
ou dHELVETIUS?" is posed in AR 111, 2); and always faithful to PASCAL, he
agreed with STUART MILL in an attempt to make freedom and democracy
compatible. There was an important difference, however: the French thinker
considered democracy also (especially) as a social state. The difference
between them does not stem so much from the fact that TOCQUEVILLE was a
Whig and that MILL was inclined towards French radicalism, as NEGRO
maintains5, but rather that TOCQUEVILLE, perhaps unintentionally, was
capable of formulations that were closer to Rousseau's set of theories. Perhaps
without CHATEAUBRIAND and without the traditionalist background of his
ideology, it would be impossible to understand the radicalism and scope of his
idea of democracy.
This clear-thinking aristocrat, a politician without followers and out of
luck, devised a theory of democracy that has stood the test of time. However, in
his writings he was not enthusiastic about it, but rather analyzed its profound
trends, precisely in order to avoid them.
The key that enables us to begin to understand TOCQUEVILLE's
theories lies in the opposition between aristocracy and democracy. It is not just
a matter of political opposition between political systems. Aristocracy and
democracy are two social states, two types of society that preclude each other.
It is therefore impossible to resort to mixed forms. If aristocracy is the
"permanent inequality of classes" and democracy is the "equality of classes",
the clash between the two of them places a society based on social inequality
in confrontation with a society based on equality.
History shows us the direction in which the contradiction is resolved.
"Les peuples chrétiens me paraissent offrir de nos jours un effrayant spectacle;
le mouvement qui les emporte est déjà assez fort pour qu'on ne puisse le
suspendre, et il n'est pas encore assez rapide pour qu'on désespère de le
diriger: leur sort est entre leurs mains; mais bientôt il leur échappe" (D
Introduction). The democratic revolution itself has destroyed the old aristocratic
and feudal world. Aristocratic society is at an end and a new society is
emerging. This is his point of departure. "L'aristocratie était déjà morte quand
j'ai commencé à vivre et la démocratie n'existait point encore" (letter to Henry
REEVE, 22-111-1837).
Democracy is not the result of an accident, but it stems from the changes
in the structure of land ownership. The latter lost its exclusive character as a
source of power, at the same time as equality was established. Everything
confirms this trend. "Mais voici les rangs qui se confondent; les barrières
élevées entre les hommes s'abaissent; on divise les domaines, le pouvoir se
partage, les lumières se répandent, les intelligences s'égalisent; l'état social
devient démocratique, et l'empire de la démocratie s'établit enfin paisiblement
dans les institutions et dans les moeurs" (D Intr.).
Moreover, all this happens because democracy responds to an
irresistible historical impulse. It is "le fait le plus continu, le plus ancien et le
plus permanent que l'on connaisse dans l'histoire" (D Intr.). The arrival of
equality of classes is providential: "Le développement graduel de l'égalité des
conditions est donc un fait providentiel, il en a les principaux caractères: il est
universel, il est durable, il écahppe chaque jour à la puissance humaine; tous
les événements comme tous les hommes, servent à son développement" (D
Intr.). It appears to be a process desired by God.
However, let us not confuse the allusion to Providence with its
theoretical use by the French counter-revolutionaries, in particular by DE
BONALD. Of course, TOCQUEVILLE was educated in a monarchic
environment, but it is more likely that his message, addressed to the people of
his class who were guided by legitimism, made him reinforce his argument with
a surplus of legitimacy, which could easily be isolated from the mechanics of
progress of the society he was describing: the struggle for a wider distribution
of property. The democratic revolution is neither the work of the devil nor a
punishment from heaven for the arrogance of humans who dared to question
God. It is the result of the crisis of feudalism and the search for greater equality
of property. Summing up all his ideas, he repeated it at the end of his life:
"Tous les hommes de nos jours sont entraînés par une force inconnue qu'on
peut espérer régler et ralentir, mais non vaincre, qui tantôt les pousse
doucement et tantôt les précipite vers la destruction de l'aristocratie" (AR
Preface).
In short, two social states clash. Aristocracy ends. Democracy, its
opponent, wins. This is the meaning of history.
However, let us not identify TOCQUEVILLE with progressivism either, as
BURY suggests6. Democracy is no better than aristocracy; it is merely the
future. It is not the attainment of the kingdom of values through human effort.
This is the difference between him and the theoreticians of progress. He has no
particular affection for democracy. He merely confirms its advance, without
judging it: "Je n'ai même pas prétendu juger si la révolution sociale, dont la
marche me semble irrésistible, était avantageuse ou funeste à l'humanité; j'ai
admis cette révolution comme un fait accompli ou prêt à s'accomplir" (D Intr.).
It is not a question of discussing the merit of one or other formula,
because it is no longer possible to choose between aristocracy and democracy.
He said in a letter to Eugène STOFFELS (21–Il-1835): "J'ai prétendu leur
démontrer que, quelle que fût leur opinion à cet égard, il n'était plus temps de
délibérer; que la question n'était point de savoir si l'on pouvait obtenir
l'aristocratie ou la démocratie, mais si l'on aurait une société démocratique
désordonnée et dépravée, livrée à des fureurs frénétiques ou courbée sous un
joug plus lourd que tous ceux qui ont passé sur les hommes depuis la chute de
l'Empire romain".
It is from this point of view that we have to place TOCQUEVILLE's
famous statement: "Il faut une science politique nouvelle à un monde tout
nouveau" (D Intr.). It is a question of understanding the new world, in order to
be able to guide it. A theoretical aspiration in which axiology is an incentive for
reconsidering traditional explanations. This scientific desire has been strongly
stressed by LIVELY7, FELDHOFF8 or HENNIS9, although he has been
underestimated as a scientist by James BRYCE10, PIERSON11 or VOSSLER12.
Moreover, it is for that reason that, despite the well-known connections
of accent and method with MONTESQUIEU, the relationship with him is not that
of a follower. Ever since ROYER-COLLARD praised the first volume of
Democracy in America, saying that "nothing like this has appeared since
MONTESQUIEU" or since SAINTE-BEUVE gave his opinion that "his inferiority
is clear if one compares him with MONTESQUIEU", the debate on his scientific
content has continued and his privileged connection with MONTESQUIEU has
been reaffirmed from ARON13 and RICHTER14 to CHEVALLIER15 and
LAMBERTI16. MAYER linked him with PASCAL and only slightly with
MONTESQUIEU, and DIEZ DEL CORRAL17 stressed in particular the debt he
owed to the philosopher PORT-ROYAL and to ROYER-COLLARD. In the end it
was TOCQUEVILLE himself who said: "Il y a trois hommes avec lesquels je vis
tous les jours un peu: c'est Pascal, Montesquieu et Rousseau" (letter to Louis
de KERGOLAY, 10-XI-1836).
However, society and the political world had been overturned, so that his
connection with MONTESQUIEU, although it went beyond that of the literary
style of subtitles, as PIERSON claims, it was more in values than in ideas. It
could not be any other way. His theoretical paradigm had to be founded on
other bases, precisely because the aim is to explain a different reality.
TOCQUEVILLE talks from the new world, from the emerging capitalist society.
The Anthropological Concept
We have seen how, for TOCQUEVILLE, class equality is a developing
reality. This natural trend, owing to the fact that it is so inexorable, must come
from divine will, the meaning of which always escapes human beings. We may
discover it, but we cannot understand it in its deepest sense. No rationality
therefore, can be known on this matter. It is only because of it that a person
participates with his free will.
This person is not in himself either good or bad. He is neither a wolf, nor
a peaceful property owner, nor a noble savage. Man is a mixture of positive
and negative forces. "Tu sais que sans être plus détaché qu'un autre de la
bête, j'adore l'ange et que je voudrais à tout prix le voir prédominer. Je me
travaille donc la tête sans cesse pour découvrir, s'il n'y aurait pas entre ces
deux extrêmes, un chemin moyen où l'humanité pût se tenir et qui ne conduisit
ni à Héliogabale ni à Saint Jérome; car je me tiens pour assuré qu'on
n'entraînera jamais le gros des hommes vers l'un ni vers l'autre, et moins
encore vers le second que vers le premier" (letter to Louis de KERGOLAY, 5-
VIII-1836). Men are neither very good nor very bad; they are a mixture of good
and evil. They live in permanent tension between one pole and the other.
This permanent dualistic character of human nature, which excludes the
ability to achieve perfection, is ruled by instinct and by art. Instinct carries out
the trend of history. The art of the spirit regulates and moderates what is bad in
the instinct and keeps the person on an acceptable, albeit unstable, moral
plane.
Only from the supposition of conflict as being permanent can there arise
a moral balance between instinct and art, between democracy and freedom,
between Heliogabalus and Saint Jerome. A difficult and precarious balance. A
balance that institutions, laws, and in particular customs can help to uphold.
The person is motivated by the search for material well-being and a
leveling of property. This is his instinct. We are far from the man who
maximizes utility in a conflicting society. Social conflict arises from the struggle
for equality. However, a democratic society is capable of living as an integrated
unit, in a scheme belonging more to LOCKE and JEFFERSON than to
MADISON.
We have, then, a person who acts against privileges from the desire or
instinct of equality rather than from goodness, egoism, or justice. A person who
acts as a "homo economicus", always looking for the leveling of property,
because this is the heart of equality.
How does this person relate to others? This already comes from nature,
not only from the social state shaped by history and by responsible will. "L'état
social est ordinairement le produit d'un fait, quelquefois des lois, le plus
souvent de ces deux causes réunies; mais une fois qu'il existe, on peut le
considérer lui-même la cause première de la plupart des lois, des coutumes et
des idées qui règlent la conduite des nations... Pour connaître la législation et
les moeurs d'un peuple, il faut donc commencer par étudier son état social" (D
1,3).
TOCQUEVILLE, with his ambivalent moral view of the person, incapable
of reaching perfection, conceives the balance between instinct and spirit as the
key. He defines a world of the superstructure that is not explained by itself,
despite extensive valuation of the individual subjective level, but that finds its
rational origin in the social state on which it is based, which at the same time is
the result of the social struggle occurring in history in the dispute over the
distribution of property.
Democracy as a Model
TOCQUEVILLE has a passion for freedom, not equality. However,
democracy becomes the central theme of his thinking. Democracy is a social
state, which includes democratic government as one of its features. Therefore,
it is a democracy, which like the first liberalism, refuses to be reduced to the
enclosure of the State and the Law to cover the whole of society.
In the well-known phrase at the beginning of Democracy in America he
states that class equality (democracy) "fait étendre son influence fort au-delà
des moeurs politiques et des lois, et... il n'obtient pas moins d'empire sur la
société civile que sur le gouvernement" (D Intr.). Democracy is not, therefore, a
procedural technique of choosing leaders or of decision-making, nor only a
legal and political reality, but a social state, that includes the political world as
one part, adapted to the rest. Don't we hear an echo of MONTESQUIEU's
division between social state and political state?
Democracy is a universal reality; it is not an American peculiarity. It will
arrive in France: "Il me paraît hors de doute que tôt ou tard nous arriverons,
comme les Américains, à l'égalité presque complète des conditions" (D Intr.). It
even partly but irreversibly exists already. It is necessary, therefore, to
understand it, in order to regulate it and moderate it. And for this reason
TOCQUEVILLE builds up a scheme of ideas, from observations made in the
country where it already exists. "Parmi les peuples qui l'ont vue s'opérer dans
leur sein, j'ai cherché celui chez lequel elle a atteint le développement le plus
complet et le plus paisable" (D Intr.).
Therefore, TOCQUEVILLE studied democracy in America and not
American democracy. He studied democracy in the State and in the new
society, not in the pre-capitalist city and world. From observation of the reality,
he then made a model (which owes some of its parts to England, which he
admired greatly, as FONTMICHEL18 and DRESCHER19 have stressed), which
would enable him to give an overall meaning to the reality and to each one of
its parts. SAINT-BEUVE criticized him for the "lack of examples to illustrate or
enliven some pages." But this is the core of his method: to observe, select the
facts and intellectually construct a model that can be used to provide an even
better understanding of the initial hypothesis: "En partant des notions que me
fournissait la société américaine et française, j'ai voulu peindre les traits
généraux des sociétés démocratiques dont aucun complet modèle n'existe
encore" (letter to J. STUART MILL, 18-X-1840). American democracy is not the
model, but from it, one can construct a theoretical model, that makes it possible
to understand the whole of the democratic reality. History is no longer a bag full
of examples; it is a development that must be understood in its change.
He did not intend, then, with the natural law concepts of rationalism and
the recourse to a pre-civil state to justify Society or the State. Neither did he
adopt the British Utilitarianism of the age. But even less was he a radical
empiricist. On this track, he was following in the steps of MONTESQUIEU, in
considering observation and history to be the basic tools of scientific
reasoning. Although in his case, it was a history that was divided into periods
by social states and by an observation that, expressed by reason, helped to
construct a theoretical model: democracy is the social state of a single class,
that brings with it a coherent democratic political State. Therefore, a new
political science must be constructed. There must be a new world.
Thus, his method was neither historical, nor comparative (the object of
his study was not entirely clear), nor legal (democracy is a whole), nor
philosophical (it is necessary to understand what it will be). He constructed an
overall theoretical model of democracy, from an interpretation of history, based
on the struggle for equality as the driving force, and on the observation of a
case, so as to be able, from scientific knowledge, to regulate and moderate
human instincts and to be able to establish an integrated society based on
freedom.
Social Classes and the Democratic Revolution.
TOCQUEVILLE conceived democracy as a social state, a necessary
assumption of political democracy, and thought, as well as JEFFERSON, that
democracy required people either economically self-sufficient, owners, or who
could become so. As LASKI stated, "he noticed that property privileges were
contradictory with popular sovereignty"20.
The many existent situations relating property articulate the most reliable
human groups in community: the social classes. "Je parle des classes, elles
seules doivent occuper l'histoire" (AR 11,12). Together with a wide tendency of
French contemporary historiography, for TOCQUEVILLE the subjects of History
are classes. These classes move around the main conflict: the unequal division
of richness, and, especially, of property. He repeatedly quotes three of them
(although he often blends whether dividing or applying epithets to them):
aristocracy or upper classes, including nobility; bourgeoisie or middle class;
and the people. These classes fight each other in many conflicts that reach the
highest level in the alteration of the social state. This struggle can become
global: "Le tiers état et la noblesse étaient entremêlés sur le même sol; mais ils
y formaient comme deux nations distinctes qui, vivant sous les mêmes lois,
restaient cependant étrangères l'une à l'autre" (Etat social et politique de la
France avant et depuis 1789, 1).
In this context of class struggle, revolutions occur. Or in
TOCQUEVILLE's words, democratic revolution. He was not in favor of political
revolution. His personal development and his writings are witness to that. Even
his family background separated him from them. Hadn't his great-grandfather
MALESHERBES died, together with his daughter and his son-in-law, on the
scaffold for having defended Louis XVI during the Convention? Weren't his
parents saved from the same fate thanks to 9 Thermidor? Almost certainly, his
family and the social sphere in which he was brought up did not think kindly of
the Revolution.
But the coming of democracy is a revolution, which overturns the
aristocratic society. In his first book, he is categorical: democracy is revolution.
But in 1836, he appears to soften the idea: "Tout ce que la Révolution a fait se
fût fait, je n'en doute pas, sans elle; ell n'a été qu'un procédé violent et rapide à
l'aide duquel on a adapté l'état politique à l'état social, les faits aux idées et les
lois aux moeurs" (Etat II).
He mentions, however, two different revolutions: the social one and the
political one, the revolution as a process and as an act, the fundamental one
and the one capable of adapting the political world to society. Social revolution
had come so far that a change in politics was needed: this was the French
Revolution. "Quelque radicale qu'ait été la Révolution, elle a cependant
beaucoup moins radicale qu'ait été la Révolution, elle a cependant beaucoup
moins innové qu'on ne le suppose généralement ... Elle n'était que la
terminaison soudaine et violente d'une oeuvre à laquelle dix générations
d'hommes avaient travaillé ... La Révolution a achevé soudainement ... ce qui
se serait achevé peu à peu de soi-même à la longue" (AR 1,5). Another kind of
adaptive politics would have been possible. And, for TOCQUEVILLE,
preferable. Political revolution is an epiphenomenon, because deep-seated,
fundamental revolution can operate with or without it. Social (evolutional)
revolution is true revolution.
This idea of the traditional and evolutionary nature of change, this
consideration of political revolution as unnecessary and undesirable, this study
of the long-term historical causes underlying violent phenomena led him to be
related to BURKE, whose work he knew and quoted, although he would
continue not to be connected with it. A tradition of interpretation, expressed by
KIRK21 or Claude POLIN22, agreed with GLADSTONE's declaration that
"TOCQUEVILLE was the BURKE of his century"23. The search for the roots of a
society that continues to be impassive in the face of revolutionary disturbances
and the rather cool attitude towards democracy, are aspects that have been
shown by this current. But it seems to me that TOCQUEVILLE is clear on this
matter: democratic revolution is a deep-seated revolution that follows its own,
albeit unfinished course. In Souvenirs, he said: "1830 me semblait avoir clos
cette première période de nos révolutions ou plutôt de notre révolution, car il
n'y en a qu'une seule, révolution toujours la même à travers des fortunes et des
passions diverses, que nos pères ont vu commencer et que, suivant toute
vraisemblance, nous ne verrons pas finir" (S. I,1). Violent incidents, that are
usually called revolutions, result from democratic revolution that operates in an
evolutionary way. Political revolutions are secondary, and inevitable aspects of
this. There is only one revolution: the one created by the single class society.
The French Revolution was not its culmination, and nothing will stop its
advance.
The Single Class Society
A democratic society is a society of independent people, which is united
once again by bonds of solidarity, as it is no longer divided into classes. It is
based on acquired status rather than on status awarded by appointment. It is
"un état social dans lequel la loi ni la coutume ne retiennent plus personne à sa
place" (D II,2,XIII) and in which "les prérogatives de naissance et de fortune
sont détruites, que toutes les professions sont ouvertes à tous, et qu'on peut
parvenir de soi-même au sommet de chacune d'elles" (D II,2,XIII).
After the destruction of the feudal restrictions of the labor market and the
disappearance of aristocracy, the new society "ne multiplie donc pas seulement
le nombre des travailleurs; -tandis qu'elle les dégoute de l'agriculture, elle les
dirige vers le commerce et l'industrie" (D II,2,XIX). "Dans les démocraties, il n'y
a rien de plus grand ni de plus brillant que le commerce" (D Il,2,XIX), to the
point where "la plupart (of the farmers) ont fait de l'agriculture un commerce" (D
II,2,XIX). In his books, TOCQUEVILLE describes a budding capitalist society,
possibly prior to the moment in which he writes, and which owes a very great
deal to Jacksonian mythology. But it leads to an underestimation of its
economic mechanisms, basic social coagulants, in particular from the point of
view of the "new" bonds arising between people, a subject of great concern to
him.
Democracy demands democratic institutions, as we shall see later on,
but above all, it demands a democratic society. "Pour moi, quand je verrais des
institutions démocratiques s'établir chez un peuple où régnera une grande
inégalité dans les conditions, je considérerai ces institutions comme un
accident passager" (Etat I). "Mais la plus dangereuse de toutes les inégalités
est celle qui résulte de l'indivision de la propieté foncière... Il n'y a rien au
contraire de plus favorable au règne de la démocratie que la division de la terre
en petites propriétés" (Etat I). Therefore, democracy means the disappearance
of aristocracy and the creation of a society of equals, of small property owners,
although democratic institutions may also be maintained if there is not great
inequality. It is not a matter of there not being rich people, but of there not
being aristocratic classes. "A vrai dire, quoiqu'il y ait des riches, la classe des
riches n'existe point; car ces riches n'ont pas d'esprit ni d'objets communs, de
traditions ni d'ésperances communes. Il y a donc des membres mais point de
corps" (D II,2,XX).
According to BIRNBAUM24, the democratic society for TOCQUEVILLE
“constitutes a whole, a whole of which the parts are linked to each other, where
the social groups have no private interest that would inevitably cause a
confrontation ...; he thinks this principle to be essential for keeping the integrity
of the social body". The nineteenth century thinker says: "Quand un peuple a
un état social démocratique ... il n'existe plus dans son sein de castes ni de
classes, et tous les citoyens y sont à peu près égaux en lumières et en biens"
(D II,3,XX,n.2). Then "chaque classe venant à se rapprocher des autres et à s'y
mèler" (D II,2), all of them are moving towards their disappearance.
However, aristocratic trends have not disappeared. In a projection
towards the future, TOCQUEVILLE pointed out two new ones: manufacturing
aristocracy and officials.
Let's look first at the case of the industrial bourgeoisie as the new
aristocracy, as a new class: "Je pense qu'à tout prendre, l'aristocratie
manufacturière que nous voyons s'élever sous nos yeux est une des plus dures
qui aient paru sur la terre; mais elle est en même temps une des plus
restreintes et des moins dangereuses. Toutefois, c'est de ce côté que les amis
de la démocratie doivent sans cesse tourner avec inquiétude leurs regards;
car, si jamais l'inégalité permanente des conditions et l'aristocratie pénètrent de
nouveau dans le monde, on peut prédire qu'elles y entreront par cette porte" (D
II,2,XX). There are certainly examples to prove that it was already a reality in
his age, but even so, it had to be stressed, as well as the relationship between
the bourgeoisie and the workers. "Dans la lutte continuelle que ces deux
classes se livrent pour les salaires, les forces sont donc partagées, les succès
alternatifs. Le est même à croire qu'à la longue l'interêt des ouvriers doit
prévaloir" (D II,3). The description of the bourgeoisie and the workers as
classes arising in the historical process of forming the single class society is
therefore significant.
The other new factor in class division is the official. He may be analyzed
from the ideas on growth and centralization of the power of the State. In
Europe, the princes "substituent des fonctionnaires à l'aristocratie" (AR I,2), he
asserts in discussing the Old Régime, and criticizes the physiocrats who
replace the nobility with officials in order to ensure their subjects' material well-
being.
"Les fonctionnaires administratifs, presque tous bourgeois, forment déjà
une classe qui a son esprit particulier, ses traditions, ses vertues, son honneur,
son orgueil prope. C'est l'aristocratie de la société nouvelle" (AR II,6).
Don't we find ourselves confronted by the two basic groups of the July
Monarchy? Don't we also find ourselves confronted by the two basic parts of
present social systems? Isn't this man, established in a nobility that had
already ended, defining the two dominant classes of modem industrial
societies, the aristocracies of the two countries which, in his famous allegory,
were proclaimed «par un dessein secret de la Providence à tenir un jour dans
ses mains les destinées de la moitié du monde» (D I, Concl.)?
Despite all this, however, the slow, evolutionary, egalitarian democratic
advance continues on its way towards a classless society, the only sound basis
of democratic institutions.
Democratic Government
TOCQUEVILLE did not share the liberal idea of the State. MAYER said
that "the liberal idea of the State was alien to him, and he even thought it
contemptible. He hated the Philistine, whose one request of the State was to be
guaranteed a good night's sleep".
His political scheme was governed by the equality of participation in the
power of the State, which is to say by the presence of citizens. And just as he
did not accept mixed forms between aristocracy and democracy, understood as
social states, nor did he accept mixed forms of government. "Ce m'est pas que,
pour conserver la liberté, je crois qu'on puisse mélanger plusieurs principes
dans un même gouvernement, de manière à les opposer réellement l'un à
l'autre. Le gouvernement qu'on appelle mixte m'a toujours semblé une chimère.
Il n'y a pas, a vrai dire, de gouvernement mixte ... parce que, dans chaque
société, on finit par découvrir un principe d'action qui domine tous les autres"
(D I,2,VII). This is a far cry from MONTESQUIEU.
The Constitution organizes the democratic government, and by the fact
that it represents "la volonté de tout le peuple, oblige les legislateurs comme
les simples citoyens" (D I,1,VI). This is based on the principle of popular
sovereignty. "Je pense donc qu'il faut toujours placer quelque part un pouvoir
social supérieur à tous les autres" (D 1,2,VII), and in democracy, this is the will
of the people. Obedience finds its legitimacy in the participation in power of all
the people.
In a democratic government (for example in America) "la société y agit
par elle-même et sur elle-même. Il n'existe de puissance que dans son sein ...
Le peuple participe à la composition des lois par le choix des législateurs, à leur
application par l'election des agents du pouvoir exécutif" (D I,I,IV). Popular
sovereignty, then, despite the transitory and ethereal sovereignty of the human
race, unifies all power and is expressed by the citizens, directly in the
townships or through representatives elected by all, namely by universal
suffrage. The method of participation is secondary for democracy. It does not
require unique criteria and may combine forms of representation and
participation.
The treatment of democracy in the State, its idea of freedom and
difference, and the consideration of democratic government as that in which the
people take part to a greater or lesser extent, lead it to an insistence on
representation (which may be combined with direct participation at a local
level), that presupposes the existence of a certain and necessary inequality.
Not of conditions, but of situations and of opinions. If there were absolute
equality, the electoral procedure could be by lot, in the Athenian style. The
election of representatives demands a choice between different, unequal
realities. In New England "le peuple, en même temps qu'il échappe à toutes les
supériorités que la richesse et la naissance ont jamais créés parmi les
hommes, s'est habitué à respecter les supériorités intellectuelles et morales, et
à s'y soumettre sans déplaisir: aussi voit-on que la démocratie dans la Nouvelle
Angleterre fait de meilleurs choix que parout ailleurs" (D I,2,V). Even in equal
conditions, there is still a certain underlying, let's say "functional" inequality. On
an electoral basis, an open elite is formed with possibly less exceptional
qualities than other classes, but ensures government.
But even though customs may make the election respect intellectual and
moral "superiorities", it is preferable to adopt a second-degree suffrage,
because it keeps the voter apart from the elected person, and it removes the
latter from the passions of the people, ensuring a better choice. "Je ne ferai
pas difficulté de l'avouer; je vois dans le double degré électoral le seul moyen
de mettre l'usage de la liberté politique à la portée de toutes les classes du
peuple" (D I,2,V).
Just as STUART MILL moderated universal suffrage with the plural vote,
TOCQUEVILLE attempted to do so with second-degree suffrage. His argument
in favor of universal suffrage is not based in its beneficial effects, but only on
the logical necessity of equality of participation by citizens, a cardinal rule in
democracy. The only thing we can do is moderate it and regulate it.
But wasn't the trend of French legitimism, led by GENOUDE, which
encouraged the Carlo-Republican alliances, in favor of universal suffrage
against the restricted suffrage of the liberals?
Popular sovereignty, whether acting directly, or doing so through
representatives, operates on the basis of majority rule. In the democratic idea
dominant in continental Europe, the search for unanimity appeared as the
demonstration of the existence of a true democracy. But in the absence of
mythical, and non-existent unanimity, majority rule, of definite British origin,
takes over.
This leads to the necessity of setting limits to power. "Un gouvernement
ne saurait pas plus suffire à entretenir seul et à renouveler la circulation des
sentiments et des idées chez un grand peuple, qu'à y conduire toutes les
entreprises industrielles" (D II,2,V). The basic limits of the political world are:
freedom of thought (and those resulting from it) and non-state ownership of the
means of production.
Power cannot be all-powerful. We must avoid "l'instinct qui porte tout
gouvernement à vouloir mener seul toutes les affaires, instinct qui demeurait
toujours le même à travers de la diversité des agents" (AR II,5). This means, on
one hand, dividing power and separating powers, because "tous les pouvoirs
tendent naturellement vers l'unité, et ce n'est qu'avec beaucoup d'art qu'on
peut parvenir à les tenir divisés" (AR II,5). And on the other hand, it means
participation by the citizens in collective life. Limits and division of power, and
participation are the barriers against State inertia to absorb social life.
Harmful Tendencies of Democracy
After asserting the tendency to concentrate power in the State,
TOCQUEVILLE sees two great dangers in democracy: tyranny of the majority
and individualism.
A) The majority has to rule, but within certain limits. In democracy,
political decisions are only taken by majority rule. But the number is not a
criterion for defining the correctness of a decision. How can we know that a
majority (or all) is not wrong? We must guarantee not only discussion, but
above all a possible change of decision. This is a subject that STUART MILL
also discussed in a particular way in On Liberty (1859). Liberty is the freedom
to disagree. Fundamentally, the matter does not consist in knowing who is
right, but what the reasons are. Unanimism would lead democracy into
despotism.
If popular sovereignty should not be based on unanimity, neither can it
be totalitarian. "Je regard comme impie et détestable cette maxime, qu'en
matière de gouvernement la majorité d'un peuple a le droit de tout faire" (D
I,2,VII). There should be a limit in order to guarantee freedom. "La toute-
puissance me semble en soi une chose mauvaise et dangereuse... Il n'y a donc
pas sur la terre d'autorité si respectable en elle-même, ou revêtue d'un droit si
sacré, que je voulusse laisser agir sans contrôle et dominer sans obstacles.
Lors donce que je vois accorder le droit et la faculté de tout faire à une
puissance quelconque, qu'on appelle peuple ou roi, démocratie ou aristocratie,
qu'on l'exerce dans une monarchie ou dans une république, je dis: là est le
germe de la tyrannie, et je cherche à aller vivre sous d'autres lois" (D I,2,Vll).
The risk of tyranny, by all or by the majority, means the need to
introduce the legitimacy of the minority and the limitation of the mandate arising
from popular sovereignty, from the law. The brake on tyranny is the right not to
be equal. It consists in limiting the law for the majority too. Democracy, as the
result of the desire for equality, leads to the danger of considering any
difference as inequality and of creating the desire not to be different. The right
to be different is the criterion of freedom that prevents majority rule from
degenerating into tyranny, and popular sovereignty from resulting in despotism.
Since the opinion of a person about the common interest is an
expression of his own private interest, all that exist are majority private
interests. The result of this, on one hand, is that they all have an equal right to
be protected, and on the other hand, that corruption (the predominance of
private interest in public life) continues to be a permanent risk. Therefore, the
exercise of legislative power should be limited. One of TOCQUEVILLE’s
concerns, as it was for the founding fathers, was to avoid the tyranny of law, of
the Legislature.
B) Individualism is the other possible great evil of democracy. If we
relate him to ROUSSEAU, we can understand, as HENNIS asserts, that "what
most interested TOCQUEVILLE throughout his work was an attempt to stop the
radical separation between the human being and the citizen". Or i  other
words, the reduction of the person to a private person. Of course, this idea is
linked to ROUSSEAU, but also to the traditionalism that refuses to accept the
division between Society and State, between private and public. The search for
the reunification of the community, and of man, is present both in traditionalism
and in radical democracy, in their criticisms of the Liberal State.
TOCQUEVILLE sees in individualism a vice that undermines the collective life,
but that also destroys the person. Perhaps because fundamentally he is not
searching for bourgeois freedom against absolutism, but freedom for the
citizen, with the aim of strengthening the cohesion and solidarity of the social
body, that are upset by class hatred and struggle. Freedom, Equality, … Isn't
Solidarity the classical name for Fraternity?
Individualism is not egoism. This is "un sentiment réflechi et paisible qui
dispose chaque citoyen à s'isoler de la masse de ses semblables et à se retirer
à l'écart avec sa famille et ses amis; de telle sorte que après s'être ainsi créé
une petite société à son usage, il abandonne volontiers la grande société à elle-
même" (D II,2,II). This is not an assertion of individuality, but cuts off a large
part of it: the interest in public affairs. Egoism kills the citizen in the heart of the
individual. "Tarit ... la source des vertus publiques" (D II). Democracy "ramène
(man) sans cesse vers lui seul et menace de le renfermer enfin tout entier dans
la solitude de son prope coeur" (D II,2JI). Isn't a crowd of solitary people a risk
of mass democracy?
Individualism derives from the passion for equality, which creates
conformity and passiveness when man's well being is guaranteed. Then there
arises "une foule innombrable d'hommes semblables et égaux, qui tournent
sans repos sur eux-mêmes pour se procurer les petits et vulgaires plaisirs dont
ils remplissent leur âme" (letter to Henry REEVE, 22-111-1837). This is the
basis of despotism, that "en fixant ... les citoyens dans l'enfance .... pourvoit à
leur sécurité, prévoit et assure leurs besoins,... et réduit chaque nation à n'être
plus qu'un troupeau d'animaux timides et industrieux dont le gouvernement est
le berger" (D II). This led POLIN to assert that for TOCQUEVILLE "the
democratic society cannot be a community but only a permanent revocable
contract, a coalition of the majority against some, a disguised form of struggle
of all against all, only lessened by the universalization of benefits". This is a
Hobbesian state of nature, which survives while there is struggle for equality,
but which, as man approaches it, sees its members disband and become
isolated in the State’s hands. It is perhaps for this reason that MANENT25 was
able to assert that the enemies of democracy are also "its excessive or
immoderate friends".
Freedom as a Remedy
Freedom is needed to moderate and regulate the bad aspects of
democracy. "Je dis que, pour combattre les maux que l'égalité peut produire, il
n'y a qu'un remède efficace: c'est la liberté politique" (D II,2,IV). This freedom
must be shown both in the State and in Society.
A) As regards the State, we have already said that freedom should
divide power, through horizontal power sharing (decentralization) and division
of powers.
1. The main aim of decentralization, in particular federalism and
municipal self-government, is to make solidarity possible. Once more
TOCQUEVILLE does not agree with liberalism. He says: "Il y a deux moyens
de diminuer la force de l'autorité chez une nation. Le premier est d'affaiblir le
pouvoir dans son principe même,en ôtant à la société le droit ou la faculté de se
défendre en certains cas: affaiblir l'autorité de cette manière, c'est en général
ce qu'on appelle en Europe fonder la liberté" (D I,5). But "il est un second
moyen de diminuer l'action de l'autorité ... : diviser l'usage de ses forces entre
plusieurs mains... En partageant ainsi l'autorité, on rend, il est vrai, son action
moins irrésistible et moins dangereuse, mais on ne la détruit point" (D I,5). This
is what he proposes: to decentralize power.
But he acknowledges that "l'égalité suggérait aux hommes la pensée
d'un gouvernement unique, uniforme et fort... C'est donc vers un gouvernement
de cette espèce que tendent les nations de nos jours" (D II,4,III). And he adds:
"Pour ma part, je ne saurais concevoir qu'une nation puisse vivre ni surtout
prospérer sans une forte centralisation gouvernementale" (D I, 1,V). In order to
resolve the problem, TOCQUEVILLE resorts to a distinction between two kinds
of interests: "Certains intérêts sont communs à toutes les parties de la nation...
D'autres intérêts sont spéciaux à certaines parties de la nation" (D I,1,V). The
centralization of this second kind of interests is what kills freedom. Well now,
who can define it, if not the majority? Without further specifying the weak
distinction, he says that there are groups of territorially appointed interests,
which are expressed by means of federalism and local autonomy. "Sans
institutions communales, une nation peut se donner un gouvernement libre,
main elle n'a pas l'esprit de la liberté". This is, he says, a matter of "si je puis
m'exprimer ainsi, d'éparpiller la puissance, afin d'intéresser plus de monde à la
chose publique" (D I,1,V). Wouldn't he agree in this with PROUDHON and
TAINE?
Faced with the present, the political art of freedom is required to direct
history. "Je pense que, dans les siècles démocratiques, qui vont s'ouvrir,
l'indépendance individuelle et les libertés locales seront toujours un produit de
l'art. La centralisation sera le gouvernement naturel" (D II,4,III).
2. This division of power is also specified in the traditional division of
powers. "Supposez... un corps législatif (divided into two chambers) de telle
manière qu'il représente la majorité sans être nécessairement l'esclave de ses
passions; un pouvoir exécutif qui ait une force qui li soit prope, et une
puissance judiciaire indépendente des deux autres pouvoirs; vous aurez
encore un gouvernement démocratique, mais il n'y aura presque plus de
chances pour la tyrannie" (D I,2,VII).
In this scheme judicial Power acquires a fundamental character.
"L'extension du pouvoir judiciaire dans le monde politique doit donc être
corrélative à l'extension du pouvoir électif' (D I,1,V), because "forme encore une
des plus puissantes barrières qu'on ait jamais élevées contre la tyrannie des
assemblées politiques" (D I,1,VI). It is the great counterbalance of the
legislature and the guarantee that the latter will submit to the Constitution.
Wasn't there in this idea a sprinkling of MONTESQUIEU, and a recollection of
his passage through the French Magistracy?
B) However, institutions are not everything, nor are laws. Feelings,
beliefs, ideas and customs, partly innate and partly passed on through
education, provide the basic essence of societies and governments. Thus, he
underlines the importance of the subjective level (as some American
commentators have pointed out), but even more of the social state. In any
event, there is a non-political core in politics, that always finally asserts itself.
"C'est donc réellement le peuple qui dirige, et, quoique'la forme du
gouvernement soit représentative, il est évident que les opinions, les préjuges,
les intérêts, et même les passions du peuple ne peuvent trouver d'obstacles
durables qui les empêchent de se produir dans la direction journalière de la
société" (D 1,2,1). Freedom must penetrate society, not only the institutions;
and pluralism must become evident in the State, but it must also exist in
society. This pluralism, as the basic element of democracy, has been taken up
by many modern authors (from DAHL to ALMOND), and partly from LIPSET
who explicitly acknowledges the debt26.
Social pluralism is found specifically in civil associations in which he
sees the fundamental safeguard of democracy, because they create
participation and bonds of solidarity. They are the best guarantee against
unanimism. Even political parties are assessed, although TOCQUEVILLE does
not fall into the negative view of the age: "Us partis sont un mal inhérent aux
gouvernements libres" (D I,2,II). "De notre temps, la liberté d'association est
devenue une garantie nécessaire contre la tyrannie de la majorité" (D II,4), he
said, when in France the liberals were subjecting it to considerable legal
restriction. "Pour que les hommes restent civilisés ou le deviennent, il faut que
parmi eux l'art de s'associer se développe et se perfectionne dans le même
rapport que l'égalité des conditions s'accroît" (D II,2,V). These civil
associations, which arose in order to defend the most varied interests, confine
the State to its own area, and forge the bonds of the new public spirit.
Another one of the features of this living society is the freedom of the
press, considered as the pillar of freedom of association and therefore the
guarantee of pluralism, although he warns that it may lead to passiveness in
those who feel that their views have already been expressed. A further basic
aspect, brought up by ROUSSEAU, is the concern for education as the creator
and transmitter of these bonds, as a socializing instrument.
All this is found specifically in customs resulting from the exercise of
freedom, understood as 'mores', that strengthen solidarity and social bonds, in
what we might now call "civic culture," in a continuous line from the idea of
PASCAL, derived from MONTAIGNE, according to which "custom is our
nature".
It would be unfair not to make a special mention of the place he affords
to religion. Among Americans "le respect de la religion y est, a ses yeux, la plus
grande garantie de la stabilité de l'Etat et de la sûreté des particuliers", says
TOCQUEVILLE (AR III,2). But this is not a contemplative religion, remote from
the world, but an integral part of civil life. Religion is always a brake on egoism
and the exclusive search for material well-being. It also strengthens
moderation: "Peu à peu le respect de la religion pénétra partout où les hommes
avaient quelque chose à perdre dans le désorder populaire, et l'incredulité
disparut, ou du moins se cacha, à mesure que la peur des révolutions se faisait
voir" (AR III,2).
Therefore, for him, religion is fundamental in democracy; it creates
bonds and is a moderating influence. "S'il se rencontre parmi les opinions d'un
peuple démocratique quelques-unes de ces théories malfaisantes qui tendent à
faire croire que tout périt avec le corps, considerez les hommes qui les
professent comme les ennemis naturels de ce peuple" (D II,2,XV). Don't these
words show something of the unanimist will, that he said he hated? Isn’t there
evidence in all the religious 'tremolo' of something of CHATEAUBRIAND? Or
else, from another point of view, isn't it possible to see in his work a distant
ancestor of the Christian democracies, in endeavoring to reconcile democracy
and religion?
A long list of scholars has shown, sometimes somewhat excessively, the
place of religion in his writings: LIVELY, ZUCKERT27 and GOLDSTEIN28. On
the other hand, BATTISTA29 relates it to civil ethics that combines the liberal
and religious spirit, ZANFARINO30 stresses the view of politics as part of
human spirituality, and BAGNOLI31 chooses to place it in the field of the
philosophy of democracy. Because for TOCQUEVILLE, religious beliefs are
rather "moral beliefs, collective convictions in the sense of HUME's beliefs," as
DIEZ DEL CORRAL recalls.
With his theory of democracy as a social and political state,
TOCQUEVILLE endeavors to tell his world that it should build democracy (and
not just fight it or become resigned to it). For that reason, he draws up a
scientific theory (and rules) and suggests that they take a chance on
democracy, on a classless, participating society, with a democratic and limited
government, one that creates a new solidarity, which removes the division
between citizen and private individual. All that with moderation, order, religion:
and with freedom.
Freedom
TOCQUEVILLE is a democrat in spirit and a lover of freedom at heart.
But, as we have said, he is not a liberal: he is not an individualist, his theory is
not of a State as a protector of property, nor does he favor the division between
citizen and private individual, although it was seen in this way for years, by
D'EICHTAL32, by Pierre MARCEL33 or by ORTEGA34, for example. It was not
until 1925 that REDIER35, fully taking up again TOCQUEVILLE's own
description of himself, described him as a "libéral d'une espèce nouvelle".
And finally, it was MAYER who broke the tradition by considering him, in
relation to MAX WEBER, "the first thinker who formulates the principles of the
age of mass democracy".
Freedom is the linchpin of TOCQUEVILLE's theory of democracy, and it
justifies itself: "Qui cherche dans la liberté autre chose qu'elle-même est fait
pour servir" (AR III,3). From it derives the solidarity and the bonds necessary to
keep the new society together. A freedom that should go hand in hand with
equality. "Quoique les hommes ne puissent devenir absolument égaux sans
être entièrement libres, et que par conséquent l'égalité, dans son degré le plus
extrême, se confonde avec la liberté, on est donc fondé à distinguer l'une de
l'autre" (D II,2,I). In fact, freedom has existed in various ages: it doesn't belong
to any social state; nor is it a distinctive feature of democracy.
Democracy opposes aristocracy. Freedom, despotism. But the freedom
that interests him is that of the future, as it is the only effective remedy "pour
combattre les maux que l'égalité peut produire" (D II,2,IV). Thus, "d'après la
notion moderne, la notion democratique, et j'ose le dire la notion juste de la
liberté, chaque homme, étant présumé avoir reçu de la nature les lumières
nécessaires pour se conduire, apporte en naissant un droit égal et
imprescriptible à vivre indépendent de ses semblables, en tout ce qui n'a
rapport qu'à lui-même, et à régler comme il l'entend sa prope destinée" (Etat II).
What "ce qui n'a rapport qu'à lui-même" could be is never stated, but in
any case we should agree with LUCAS VERDU, who says that for
TOCQUEVILLE freedom necessarily brings the "independence of men among
themselves or in relation to the State"36. But gradually, he also contemplates
the distribution of social power among citizens, as a sign of the independence
of will. It is not a question of defining LOCKE's liberty for property owners, his
idea of liberty presupposes rather active liberty, participation. It is not only a
balance between the liberty of the ancients and the liberty of the moderns in
the style of CONSTANT, but a unified definition of current liberty, which brings
both together into one unit. Democracy means participation, through which
social bonds, the new structures of obedience, are forged. From it, liberty must
be understood as independence in what "n'a rapport qu'à lui-même".
Liberty that is "moderate, organized, controlled by beliefs, customs and
laws means, therefore, participation in the collective life, and also an area that
is free from State action. Liberty regulates and moderates equality, in a
permanent tension or balance. Heliogabalus and Saint Jerome coexist to make
man into a morally acceptable being. Neither good, nor evil: acceptable.
A Plan for the Future
In a letter to STOFFELS on 24-07-1836, he wrote: "J'ai montré et je
continuerai à montrer un goût vif et raisonnable pour la liberté, ... mais en
même temps je professerai un si grand respect pour la justice, un sentiment si
vrai d'amour de Porder et des lois, un attachement si profond et si raisonné
pour la morale et les croyances religieuses, que je ne puis croire qu'on
n'aperçoive pas nettement en moi un libéral d'une espèce nouvelle et qu'on me
confonde avec le parti des démocrates de nos jours”.
His aim was to put forward a proposal for synthesis between democracy
and tradition, with freedom as the hinge, a freedom different from that of the
liberals. Therefore he constructs a theory about democracy. It is necessary to
know the inertias of history, because only thus will a responsible action be
possible. "Les nations de nos jours ne sauraient faire que dans leur sein les
conditions ne soient pas égales: mais il dépend d'elles que l'égalité les
conduise à la servitude ou à la liberté, aux lumières ou à la barbarie, à la
prosperité ou aux misères" (D II,4,VIII), he said at the end of his book on
Democracy. It cannot be resisted, but there is a choice of what form it should
take.
TOCQUEVILLE has no feeling for democracy, but not only does he not
dispute it, he also proposes it, although his desire for it is rather weak. From an
attitude similar to that of PASCAL, he draws up a "ari" for democracy, a
necessary wager, because everything is clear (if at all) once the choice is
made. It is a question of convincing broad sectors of France, with no future
unless they open up to the new world, to raise the flag of democracy and
freedom, a freedom that includes the most important topics of legitimism (local
autonomies, religion, order, moderation, etc.). This is the axiological aim that
from analysis of the political reality he brings into operation with a scientific
method. But his contribution to political science appears today more closely
linked to his worth as an analyst and builder of a model of democracy. The
immediate and subjective aims that stimulated him are forgotten. "I don't know",
SCHUMPETER tells us, "any better book than Democracy in America for
training oneself in the art of making this particular kind of political analysis"37.
The main thing is that, in order to fulfill his aim, TOCQUEVILLE
reformulated a theory of democracy, to which he added elements taken both
from traditionalism and from the American and British experience. Wouldn't the
example of this latter country, as in MARX, help us to explain, at least in part,
the complex modem heuristic scheme of this anglophile aristocrat? Could we
understand all his ideas without recalling his traditionalist background?
Through observation, reason and history he formed a theory with great inner
coherence and with more conviction than passion. Democracy was not seen as
a purely political mechanism, but included a coherent social base with it, in
which power was divided and distributed in a society without aristocracies
(without nations within the nation, without classes); in which democracy
demanded a single-class, pluralist, participating society held together by new
bonds, arising from liberty that regulated and moderated equality. His proposal
went beyond what his social sphere could accept, but his scientific ambition led
him to outline a theory of democracy which lay on the road to modern
democracy and a new society.
TOCQUEVILLE was concerned about leaving aside the "choice" of
France, and so he devised a radical theory that established in society the
rational root of the political world, in which he conceived democracy as a
united, progressive and open reality. Thus, it could not be confined in preset
rules and institutions. "Ce qu'on appelle les institutions nécessaires ne sont
souvent que les institutions auxquellles on est accoutumé, et qu'en matière de
constitution sociale, le champ du possible est bien plus vaste que les hommes
qui vivent dans chaque société ne se l'imaginent" (S II,2).
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